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Ethnicity and Gender in Militaries: An Intersectional Analysis

Orna Sasson-Levy

In 1980, Cynthia Enloe published *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies*, a path-breaking book that argued that the elites shape military personnel policy in ethnically divided societies, according to an ‘ethnic state security map’. This ‘map’ distinguishes between loyal ethnic groups and those whose loyalty to the state is in question. Adopting a critical perspective that shattered the view of the military as a mechanism for social integration, Enloe showed that militaries exploit ethnic identities for their own needs while also creating and recreating ethnic groups.

Several years later, Enloe published *Does Khaki Become You* (1983), a second trailblazing book that examined the status of women in militaries in particular, and militaristic societies in general. This book, which marked the beginning of Enloe’s prolonged interest in the relationship between gender and militarization processes, served as a beginning point for intensive research on gender and the military worldwide over the following decades.

However, for the most part these two bodies of knowledge, both on ethnicity and on gender in the military, have not related to each other. Ethnicized or racialized soldiers have been analysed as gender-unified groups primarily comprised only of men, and men or women have also been studied as unified groups, shaped by their ‘common gender identity’. This decoupling of gender and ethnicity in studies of the military is surprising, taking into account that intersectional analysis has been dominant in both gender and race/ethnicity research since the early 1990s (Collins 1990; Crenshaw 1991). Therefore, my aim in this chapter is to first argue for the necessity of intersectional analysis of the military, and, second, to explore, via a reading of current research, how gender and race/ethnicity intersect in constructing the social architecture of militaries.

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I first will argue that militaries are never organized by gender or by race/ethnicity alone. Militaries are always designed by the intersection of race/ethnicity and gender, and at the same time, they create ethno-gendered groups and identities. These ethno-gendered categories, which are either constructed or reaffirmed through military personnel policies, are comprised of individuals who experience their military service in different ways, have differential convertible power of the military's symbolic and material resources following their discharge (MacLean and Elder 2007), and hold differential relations with the institution of citizenship (Peterson 2010; Enloe 2014; Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2015).

Specifically, I claim that race/ethnicity-gender intersectionality operates differently for men and women of different social groups. Though this argument employs the language of 'men and women' as coherent groups, this is not done in order to obliterate the importance of intersectional analysis, but only as a framework within which intersectional analysis can be elaborated. Let me explain.

The nation-state is based on the self-sacrifice of those who fought for it, and thus death and violence lie at the heart of modern nation-states (Marvin and Ingle 1999). The military is the institution that is granted the state's monopolized legitimacy to apply lethal power; thus, violence is constitutive of the military. Violence is not only directed against those defined as external enemies, but is also directed internally, towards men and women soldiers themselves. It is always gendered and often connected to masculinity and masculinist cultures. Indeed, militaries are perceived as masculine institutions not only because they are comprised mostly of men, but also because they constitute a major arena for the construction of masculine identities through violent rites of passage (Barrett 1996; Higate 2003; Sasson-Levy 2008). Militarized violence and war have been associated with men for centuries, while women were associated with the justification for war (Nagel and Fietz 2007). Violent sacrifice under state discipline in the name of the nation is understood as the essential criterion for first class citizenship and has been imagined in many nation-states to be a masculine domain (Enloe 1994). Thus, even with today's increase in the number of women enlisting, women still constitute a numerical and social minority in the service. Most militaries still preserve a gendered division of labour, and develop formal and non-formal ways to resist changes in their gender regime. The military can, then, be analysed as an 'Extremely Gendered Organization' (Sasson-Levy 2011) that privileges men and masculinity.

In this type of organization, the military not only welcomes men from different social groups, but seeks them out. The military will recruit men regardless of their social group; citizens, non-citizens,¹ immigrants, or members of both majority and minority groups – all are welcome (there are few exceptions to this rule, as I will point out later). For men, the intersection with ethnicity marks their location *within* the military hierarchy; it determines the jobs they will be assigned and their proximity to the military core of combat.

For women, on the other hand, the intersection with ethnicity (and religiosity, as I will later show) often signifies whether they will be inside or outside of the military organization. Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1989) noted that women are often designated to be signifiers of ethnic/national differences. In order to ensure that women fulfil their role as bearers of cultural differences, the intersection of gender and ethnicity is often leveraged by various communities to discipline and supervise women (in the name of modesty, or to keep them in caretaking roles, for example), and to exclude them from the public sphere, especially when it comes to military service. Thus, in some militaries men of minority groups will enlist, but for women of the same groups, military service is perceived as taboo. In such militaries, only the ‘non-ethnic’, ‘modern’ white women enlist. In other militaries, labour market dynamics will be more important in explaining patterns of military service, and only lower-class minority women will enlist, while white middle-class women will not perceive the military as a viable option for them. In either case, it is the unique intersection of gender and ethnicity that determines whether women will be inside or outside the boundaries of the military, and it shapes their sense of belonging to the nation state accordingly. Hence, the organization of military service reproduces social hierarchies according to complicated lines of ethnicity/race and gender.

I open this chapter with a brief theoretical review of the research on ethnicity and military, and on gender and military, and will follow with the argument for intersectional analysis. I then look at the small but growing body of research that employs intersectional analysis to examine both the US and Israeli militaries in order to demonstrate its analytic productiveness.

RACE/ETHNICITY AND THE MILITARY

The research regarding ethnicity and the military can be divided into two approaches. The first approach tended to be functionalist, seeing the military as a central mechanism for modernization, cohesion and social integration (Janowitz 1976). This approach, which was common to both state leaders and scholars of military sociology, often described the military as a ‘melting pot’ or ‘people’s army’ to connote the institution’s integrative functions. State leaders believed that by obliging (mostly) men of different social groups to serve together and fight together, the military will ‘breach all ethnic, class and background barriers’ (Ben-Gurion 1957: 212). Thus, the military will not only serve as the ‘school of the nation’ (Leander 2004), but will facilitate social solidarity which is a main interest of the nation state. This contention was especially common among scholars who studied the rise of the nation states in developing countries following decolonization, who perceived the military as an ‘institution of modernization, nation-building and socialization par excellence’ (Dietz et al. 1991: 8).

This approach was common in the literature regarding developed countries as well. Stouffer et al. (1949), author of the seminal research on the American soldier, argued that the more contact white soldiers had with black troops, the

more favourable their reaction towards racial integration. Following his argument, research on race relations in the US military documented the abolishment of racial segregation in American troops by President Harry Truman in 1948, and the increase in the numbers of African American soldiers in the military after the establishment of the All-Volunteer Forces (AVF) (Butler 1992). In 1992, African Americans composed 30 per cent of the enlisted force (Moskos 1993) and the over-representation of blacks in the military, particularly in armed combat forces, became a problem in itself (Butler 1992). Though scholars agreed that 'the army is still no racial utopia' (Moskos 1993: 88), there was a tendency to conclude that race relations in the US military were more positive than that found on most college campuses, or in civilian labour markets (*ibid.*).

This integrative approach, based on the contact hypothesis, was somewhat modified, but not forsaken, by the current term of 'diversity management', rooted in the liberal idea of multi-culturalism (Dansby et al. 2001; McDonald and Parks 2012; Soeters and van der Mulen 1999). In essence, the 'melting pot' ideal was a policy of assimilation, as it positioned a 'standard soldier' as a model that individuals of all social groups should emulate. The diversity management policy, on the other hand, does not seek to unify the forces, but rather to contain cultural differences within the military. This policy, which became prevalent in most western militaries, stems first and foremost from an acute shortage of potential human resources that resulted from the shift from conscript to AVF. The decline in armies' recruitment rates and legitimacy made it necessary for them to turn to populations that had not been enlisted in the past, facilitating a process of inclusivity in terms of gender, race, ethnicity and class (Haltiner 1998). At the same time, racial, gendered and ethnic groups that had now become enlisted, proclaimed the power of identity in the army and demanded not only equal opportunities but also cultural recognition. Finally, policies of diversity management reflect militaries' need to create and preserve sufficient legitimacy among their stakeholders and cannot ignore the claim for identity, even within this allegedly universalistic institution.

Though 'diversity management' certainly recognizes cultural and gendered differences, its main worry is how to maintain cultural differences without harming military effectiveness. The main argument for diversity management is that 'an inclusive environment will enable the military to effectively capitalize on the diverse talents and strength of the current workforce members' (McDonald and Parks 2012: 1). As diversity is viewed as critical to mission readiness and national security, most of this literature offers organizational analysis, and emphasizes recommendations for 'how to' employ diversity management. Interestingly, though this literature is very current, it preserves the separation between gender issues and race/class issues within the military, and does not look at their intersections at all.

The functionalist approach was shattered by Cynthia Enloe (1980), who, as mentioned earlier, offered a critical view of the relations of militaries and ethnicity. Enloe would probably argue that the assertion that armies are mechanisms for social integration, or organizations preserving cultural pluralism, is a myth

created and maintained by state elites. Instead, Enloe asserted that in ethnically divided societies, the state elite shapes the military's human resources policy according to an 'ethnic state security map' (1980: 15–22). This map distinguishes between dominant ethnic groups that are positioned at the core of the military, and those whose loyalty to the state is questioned and are therefore placed at the margins of the military, or are excluded from service altogether. Through its recruitment, assignment and promotion policies, the state leverages and manipulates ethnicity with an aim to mobilize armies, maintain its authority, and to preserve the existing political order. Hence, militaries do not serve as mechanisms for integration, but rather they stratify among different ethnic groups by employing ethno-class divisions and reproducing them.

Enloe's work was followed by additional critical scholars who viewed the military from a conflict perspective. Yagil Levy (1998) added to Enloe's analysis the material dimension that is so crucial to the examination of social inequalities. For Levy, the most critical variable is convertibility, which is the ability of groups to convert the power they acquire in military service into valuable social positions in the civilian sphere. Levy argued that in highly militarized societies, when a dominant group is able to convert effectively its legitimately established privileged position in the military into social dominance outside the military, the military functions as a state mechanism involved in the reproduction of (ethnic or class) inequality. Therefore, Levy views the military as a battle ground for disadvantaged groups who aspire to improve their civic status through military service, which will signify their full participation in the institution of citizenship. Today, most sociologists of the military agree that militaries tend to reflect the cleavages, stratifications, class relationship and biases that are present in society as a whole, and do not play a major role as an integrating device, neither in developing nor in developed countries (Dietz et al. 1991; Burk and Espinoza 2012).

However, this body of research on race/ethnicity and the military, while very rich theoretically, methodologically and empirically, maintained a unified view of ethnic groups as consisting of one gender only – that of men. This could easily be explained by the historical context of the research, when only men were drafted to state militaries, but is a bit more difficult to accept today, when women of various ethnic/racial groups are enlisting in greater numbers than ever.

GENDER AND MILITARY

Following early sociological research that was exclusively male focused (Stouffer et al. 1949), feminist research questioned women's military under-representation and the hyper-masculine culture of military forces (Enloe 1988; Stiehm 1989). In turn, liberal feminist (Katzenstein 1998; Peach 1996; Stiehm 1989) and radical feminist (Enloe 1988; Peterson and Runyan 2010) approaches posed very different arguments about women's military participation (see also Duncanson, Chapter 3, this volume). However, both approaches looked at women as if they constituted a

homogenous group. Second wave feminism, which represented mostly white middle class women, was influential and reflected minimal awareness of racial or class differences among women.

This unified approach to gendered identities changed, interestingly, with the study of male soldiers as men, from a gendered perspective (Barrett 1996; Morgan 1994). The study of militarized masculinities was deeply influenced by Connell's theory (1995), which centres on relations between hegemonic and non-hegemonic masculinities. Here, the basic assumption is that in the military, the combat soldier embodies hegemonic masculinity, which is perceived as emblematic of good citizenship (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 1999). Men and women soldiers in various military roles shape their identity through an ongoing dialogue with the identity of the combat soldier, a dialogue that consists of both emulation and resistance (Sasson-Levy 2002). The combat soldier is thus situated at the top of an 'identity pyramid' that reflects and reproduces social stratification, shaped by the intersection of gender, race, class, ethnicity and sexuality.

The intersectional approach led scholars to examine ethnic performances of masculinity in the army (Kachtan 2012), the construction of masculinities in various (including non-combat) military roles (Barrett 1996; Sasson-Levy 2002), perceptions of masculinities among immigrant soldiers (Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport 2003), obstacles standing in the way of gay soldiers (Belkin 2012), and the construction of masculinities among peacekeeping forces (Higate and Henry 2004).

Thus, it is quite surprising that the research on women soldiers still views them as a homogenous group, unified by its difference from men (e.g., Winslow and Dunn 2002; Kümmel 2002; Heinecken 2002; Carreiras, 2006), and much research continues to distinguish between questions of gender and issues of race/ethnicity in the military.

STUDYING THE MILITARY FROM AN INTERSECTIONALITY PERSPECTIVE

As opposed to academic research, those responsible for the development of military personnel strategy never perceived men or women as homogenous groups. Rather, criteria of social class, education, age, region, religious affiliation, sexuality, race and ethnicity, have each been weighed by those who design recruitment strategy (Enloe 2014).

If the intersection of gender and race determines men and women's military assignments, it is crucial to research the military from an intersectional approach. Intersectionality theory, which originated in black feminism, claims that subjects are always situated at the intersection of several axes of power and simultaneously experience several basic systems of inequality – primarily gender, class, race or ethnicity, and sexuality (Collins 1990). The research that followed called for the recognition of multiply marginalized groups and focused on giving voice to the oppressed (Choo and Ferree 2010). Intersectionality analysis provides us with a more complex and nuanced understanding of the military service experience of men and women of different social groups.

Moreover, intersectional analysis is more appropriate for scrutinizing the relationship between gender and the military today, because since the mid-1990s the gender regime of Western militaries has undergone major changes. The shift to professional armies resulted in a dramatic increase in women's enlistment rates and the integration of women in roles that were previously considered to be 'masculine' (Haltiner 1998; Burk and Espinoza 2012). The increased integration of women into Western forces was hastened by a series of supra-national developments, such as the ruling of the European Court of Justice (2000) that EU countries must implement gender egalitarian recruitment policies and grant women access to all military positions; UN Resolution 1325 that acknowledges the importance of assimilating a gendered approach in peace making and conflict resolution; and NATO's adoption of a gender mainstreaming approach (see also Hurley, Chapter 25, this volume). The last stage in this process was the declaration of the US Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter on December 2015 that all jobs in the US forces, including all combat roles, will be open to women.

These dramatic changes in women's place in the military were driven also by the change in the mission of militaries, from that of conventional wars to situations of guerrilla conflicts, unconventional threats, peace-keeping operations, and the policing of civilian populations. Modern warfare is characterized by new combat strategies that emphasize hi-tech 'smart' weapons, remote-controlled technological combat, expanded intelligence-gathering and computing, and cyber-warfare (King 2006). Militaries now demand a more educated workforce, and since in many countries women graduate high school and college at higher rates than men, militaries have become especially active in recruiting more women (Enloe 2007). Thus, intersectional analysis is necessary from the perspectives of both the soldiers and the organization. Women or men cannot be generalized in regard to their motives to enlist, their military roles or their military experience. Similarly, the military can no longer be analysed as a binary gender-based structure.

Intersectional analysis requires new research questions, new research tools, and new perspectives on the social structure. Instead of asking what men or what women do in the military, the critical question is 'Who serves where?' Why are some groups of women tracked into clerical positions and others into prestigious training roles? Why are some ethno-class groups of men tracked into intelligence roles while others become combat soldiers? What is the subjective experience of each gendered and classed group during military service? Who gains from the gender/class structure of the military, who loses and how is this structure maintained?

There are, of course, some criticisms of intersectionality theory, and the way it is applied in social research. First, there is always the danger of reification of social groups, portraying them as unified and stable (McCall 2005). Sylvia Walby et al. (2012) suggests that rather than using concepts that offer connotations of unified blocks (e.g., 'category'), the focus should be on unequal social relations and dynamic social forces. Therefore, researchers should explore

racialization rather than race, and gendering processes rather than gendered categories. Second, in its focus on disadvantaged groups, the ‘traditional’ perception of intersectionality neglects the analysis of the effects of power relations on dominant categories (Walby et al. 2012). By avoiding the study of privileged groups, categories such as whiteness and masculinity are left unmarked and serve as the norm against which the oppressed groups are measured (Choo and Feree 2010). Indeed, intersectional research should look at both disadvantaged and privileged groups in the military, as they are always constructed in relation to each other (see, e.g., Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2015).

THE INTERSECTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE MILITARY

As most of the scholarly literature still makes a distinction between gendered and ethnic/racial analysis of the military, only the most recent and up-to-date research offers an intersectional analysis of the social architecture of the military. Such analysis allows us to learn how militaries are stratified along racial/ethno-gendered lines, and to better understand who is excluded from the military and why. My argument is that the intersection of gender, ethnicity and race operates differently for men and women in the military context: while ethnicity has different meanings and consequences for men and women, gender carries with it different meanings in different ethnic or racial groups. Thus, the intersection of gender with ethnicity/race constitutes various militarized social groups that hold differential militarized power, and thus different conversion power of military capital and different positionality in regard to the institution of citizenship. I will demonstrate this argument in the cases of the US and the Israeli militaries.

The US Armed Forces

Yagil Levy (2007) argued that ‘there is nothing natural about the composition of the army’. Indeed, looking into the social organization of the US Armed Forces, it is clear that it is neither ‘natural’ nor fixed. Rather, the intersectional structure of the US military often changes according to many internal and external factors, such as the militaries’ changing criteria for enlistment; changes in the military’s mission; economic cycles and labour market dynamics (Segal et al. 2007); geopolitical situations such as the prospects of war (Armor 1996; Burk and Espinoza 2012); globalized imposition of gender mainstreaming policies (e.g., the NATO example mentioned above); and an ongoing process of influence and emulation according to a dominant military model among militaries worldwide (Sasson-Levy 2011; Obradovic 2014).

To demonstrate the dynamic and multi-faceted nature of the ethno-gendered structure of the US military, one need not go as far back to the American Civil War. Most of the research begins with the struggle of black men to demonstrate their worthiness of first-class citizenship through participation in American war

efforts. Prior to World War II, the US military was still a segregated institution upholding Jim Crow values. White men served as combat soldiers and officers, while black men served mostly in the rear performing menial labour (Moskos 1993). White women, who were a small minority, served as secretaries and nurses, while black women served in housekeeping jobs such as cleaning, laundry and kitchen work (Meyer 1996). Racial segregation was strictly maintained not only in the division of labour, but also in living quarters and in dining and recreational facilities.

During World War II, due to the shortage of combat troops, black men were given the opportunity to fight alongside white men, and thus proved that 'segregation is not only unjust but also militarily inefficient' (Moskos 1993: 88; Armor 1996). In 1948 President Harry Truman abolished segregation in the military and a very gradual process of desegregation began. At the same time, a 2 per cent ceiling on the number of women in the military was set, and these women served in administrative, clerical and health-care jobs (Moskos 1993). This ceiling was repealed only in 1967, when women were able to enlist in greater numbers (Moore 1991). However, following a prolonged history of male-only participation, the military institutional framework was built on a foundation of masculinity and the introduction of women into the military led to pronounced gender polarization (which was illustrated by a string of sexual harassment scandals (Lundquist 2008).

By 1955, following the Korean War, all military units were racially desegregated, but with 98 per cent male. A significant turning point was ending the draft in 1973, and establishing the AVF. The shift to a professional military brought about a dramatic increase in the percentages of blacks and women in the military (Moore 1991; Iskra et al. 2002; Segal 1995). Pressures generated by the contraction in human resources coincided with the women's movement's struggle for equal rights (Katzenstein 1998) and brought about the integration of women into military academies (West Point, USAFA, USMA) as early as 1976. In 1978 Congress abolished the separate women's auxiliary corps, and women were given virtually all assignments, with the exception of all combat roles, from which they were still barred (Moskos 1993). While the number of women in the military tripled between 1974 (3.3 per cent) and 1989 (10.9 per cent), the percentage of black women serving in the armed services has increased more than six fold, from 0.56 per cent in 1974 to 3.7 per cent in 1989, and represented more than one third of active-duty enlisted women (Moore 1991: 363).

Among the army's enlisted women, black women had signed up and reenlisted in such extraordinary numbers that on the eve of the first Gulf War in the late 1980s they had become 47 per cent of all enlisted and reenlisted women soldiers and officers, which, proportionally is four times their numbers in American society as a whole (Enloe 1994). However, research repeatedly points out that black women in the past as well as in the present continue to confront the consequences of the 'double jeopardy' – racism and sexism – in the military, and are heavily concentrated in low technical occupations of administration and support (Moore 1991; Segal et al. 2007).

Today, women constitute 14 per cent of the US Armed Forces (Carreiras 2015), and the process of gender integration reached a new peak in December 2015 when Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter declared a landmark decision opening all combat and elite units to women who can meet the requirements.

Similar to gender integration, racial integration has not been a linear process. Following a decade when it was widely believed that the military was a more racially egalitarian institution than the civilian labour market, the overrepresentation of blacks among the war dead in Vietnam raised allegations by civil rights leaders that blacks and the poor were serving as cannon fodder (Burk and Espinoza 2012). As the questions of representation and the equity of burden were raised, blacks started to reconsider enlistment (Armor 1996). The criticism and opposition to the first Gulf War by some segments of the black community have brought about a decline in the number of enlisted black men and women. The post 9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have further decreased the enthusiasm regarding enlistment among blacks. Black men, in particular, have shifted their preferences for certain military occupations, moving away from service in combat units towards service in combat support and administrative occupations that require skills transferable to the civilian labour market (Armor 1996; Burk and Espinoza 2012).

The armed service branches are making up for the decline in African Americans' enlistment by recruiting more Hispanics. The rates of enlistment among Hispanic men and women have more than doubled over the past 20 years. In 2006 the civilian labour force was 17.1 per cent Hispanic, while only 12.8 per cent of military service members identified as Hispanic. However, since not all Hispanic men and women with high-school degrees are citizens or even legal immigrants, it seems that Hispanics are enlisting and remaining in the military at rates higher than their share of the labour force who meet the minimum qualifications for service (Segal et al. 2007). The assumption was that only men would enlist from Hispanic communities because of the importance of traditional cultural norms that call for women to stay at home and take care of the family. Surprisingly, the representation of Hispanic women among women soldiers slightly surpassed that of Hispanic men among their gender in the military. This suggests that labour market dynamics are very important in explaining patterns of military service, as many young people who cannot afford to go to college enter the military as a way of gaining marketable skills, ensuring economic stability and earning money towards a college degree (Kleykamp 2007). The effects of labour market dynamics is most pronounced where racial or ethnic status, gender and class (measured by education) intersect, defining doubly or triply disadvantaged people (Segal et al. 2007).

This short portrayal of the intersectional structure of the US military shows that, as Segal et al. (2007) conclude, the relatively high rates of representation in the armed forces of high-school educated African Americans (particularly women) and the increase in enlistment of Hispanics, including women, speaks to the impact of the intersection of class, gender and race/ethnicity on labour market dynamics as a key factor in shaping military social organization.

The level of satisfaction in the military is also determined by the intersections of ethnicity, gender and class. Lundquist (2008) found that black women rank the highest in terms of level of satisfaction, black men rank second highest, followed by Latinas, and then Latinos. White women fall last, suggesting that they differ least from white men in their satisfaction with military service. Lundquist argues that the higher satisfaction among minority soldiers is rooted in the military's meritocratic organization. But while the US military invests much effort in ameliorating racial tensions, it is not investing enough effort in improving gender relations (e.g., by preventing the epidemic of sexual assault, and the status of tokenism many women feel due to the fact that they comprise such a small minority in the organization) (Lundquist 2008). Burk and Espinoza (2012: 415) are less optimistic, maintaining that 'Despite efforts to the contrary, institutional racism can still be detected in the distribution of goods that are important both to the military and its service members'.

This analysis reveals that intersectionality of race/ethnicity and gender does not adequately explain the social architecture of the US military. Rather, research should always consider class, and the intersection of class with ethnicity and gender, as a major factor that determines who will serve in the military, who will be assigned to what positions, who will be promoted and how each soldier will experience his military service. Men and women of the lowest class who are unable to meet the military's criteria for acceptance: graduating high school and passing the Armed Forces Qualification Test (Burk and Espinoza 2012), are excluded from the military and prevented from enjoying its possible economic and occupational rewards (but, on the other hand, do not risk their lives in battle). Hence, the organization of the military largely depends on the level of education provided to the most disadvantaged groups of society. This has some paradoxical results, as men have a greater propensity to serve than women (Burk and Espinoza 2012) but in every social group women are more educated than men (Enloe 2007; Lundquist 2008). Moreover, the economic factor operates differently for different groups: African Americans from families with incomes below the poverty line were more interested in enlisting than whites who were similarly poor. Their interest was justified, as in the early 1980s black 17-year-old youths living in poverty who enlisted did indeed escape poverty by 1990 (Burk and Espinoza 2012). Thus, in the US, the struggle for full civic participation through military service is structured by the intersection of class, gender and race/ethnicity, and is very often determined by levels of education of disadvantaged groups.

The Israeli Military

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) presents itself as a 'people's army' (Ben-Eliezer 1995), an egalitarian institution which aims to overcome social cleavages and conflicts. However, if the US military is organized by the intersection of class, race, and gender, in Israel the most important factor that determines the boundaries of the military is nationality. Conscription in Israel is mandatory

exclusively for Jewish men and women, and for Druze men. Bedouin men can and often do volunteer to the army. Palestinian citizens of Israel, both Muslims and Christians, are exempted by law from service, though a very small minority of Palestinian men do volunteer to serve.

To justify this exemption, the state framed it as a decision stemming from moral considerations, explaining that it is meant to ensure that Palestinian citizens of Israel will not need to participate in the tragic situation of ‘their state fighting against their nation’. However, Yitzhak Reiter (1995), echoing Enloe’s (1980) concept of an ethnic state security map, claims that the real reason for the exemption is the perception that Arabs are not loyal to the state, and that they constitute a security threat. Hence, the boundaries of conscription roughly reflect the boundaries of the Zionist collective in Israel, and not the boundaries of its citizenry.

But even within the boundaries of conscription, the contradictions in Israeli military enlistment policy are many. As I will show, it seems as if the military holds different policies for each national, religious and ethnic group, and within each of these groups, the intersection with gender determines the boundaries of enlistment.

Though the military is perceived as a ‘melting pot’ (for the Jewish population), that is, a mechanism for social integration and solidarity, a number of Israeli researchers have proposed a critical analysis, asserting that the Israeli military reproduces the ethnic and class stratification of civilian society (Levy 1998). In a ground breaking article, Sami Smootha (1983) claimed that Israel’s ‘people’s army’ is actually shaped according to an ‘ethnic state security map’ which places Ashkenazi² men at the centre of the army, and the Mizrahim³ at the periphery. In order to advance within the military, the Mizrahim, who were under-represented in high-ranking positions, needed to adapt to the Western norms of the Ashkenazi elite. Thus, Smootha concluded that ethnic stratification in the army ‘apparently works to reproduce ethnic stratification, not to break it down’ (Smootha 1983: 19).

Smootha’s argument referred mostly to the vertical ethnic division of labour (the different prospects of promotion for Mizrahim and Ashkenazim), which was true to its context of the 1980s. Yagil Levy (2003) concentrated in his work on the horizontal ethnic division of labour. Levy argued that the ethnic organization of the Israeli military has changed with cycles of militarization and demilitarization. Following a cycle of demilitarization of the 1970s to the 1990s, the convertible capital one could accumulate from military service has declined, and thus investment in military service on the part of middle class Ashkenazim has decreased. The vacuum created was soon replaced with peripheral groups such as lower class Mizrahim, immigrants and women, who were striving to gain social capital and national acknowledgement through military service. Though Levy’s theory has garnered some criticism, the number of Mizrahim in the military – including in combat roles and senior command positions – has indeed increased.

Nevertheless, the ethnic stratification in the military is maintained by an occupational division of labour between soldiers in white-collar roles and soldiers in blue-collar roles. Soldiers in blue-collar roles are either of lower-class Mizrahi origin or immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Most of these soldiers are graduates of vocational high schools and hold various vocational certificates or a partial matriculation diploma; some drop out before completing their post-elementary education. They serve in low-status, labour-intensive positions (e.g., car mechanics, drivers and cooks), and cannot convert their military service into civilian economic or symbolic capital. Soldiers in white-collar roles, on the other hand, are mostly of middle-class Ashkenazi origin and graduates of superior high schools in Israel's urban centres. They serve in prestigious, knowledge-intensive occupations (e.g., computers, communications or intelligence), and accumulate social and professional capital that can easily be converted in the civilian market (Sasson-Levy 2002). This ethno-class division of labour exists among women as well – women of lower classes serve mostly as secretaries or in menial positions, while women from the middle class enjoy a wider set of occupational opportunities. Some serve in prestigious feminine roles such as education or welfare NCO's, others in less-gendered, white-collar roles (especially in intelligence) and some in so-called masculine roles such as infantry training or semi-combat soldiers. Thus, by upholding images of universalism and egalitarianism, the state actually grants legitimacy to the military's gendered ethno-class divisions of labour, which produces and reproduces social hierarchies inside and outside the military.

Other small minority groups have their own arrangements with the military, emphasizing again the importance of intersectional analysis. One such group is the Caucasus Jews that come from Azerbaijan and Dagestan, and are one of the underprivileged Jewish groups in Israel. The men of this group enlist, but are exempted from doing kitchen duties as it is perceived by them, and accepted by the army, to be a disgrace to their masculinity. Women of this group do not enlist at all, because their community sees military service as immodest for women and as harmful to their chances for marriage.

Religious groups are also divided in their perception of military service: Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men and women, who make up 10 per cent of Israel's population, are mostly exempted from service. This is a result of an arrangement that was established in 1948, officially granting deferred entry into the IDF for yeshiva (religious seminary) students, but in practice allows young Haredi men to bypass military service altogether. The Knesset (Israel's parliament) has in recent years attempted to enforce mandatory conscription on Haredi men, but to no avail. The leaders of the Haredi community object bitterly to military service, claiming that they keep the Jewish tradition alive for all of Israel, and that a promiscuous culture that is not conducive to the Haredi lifestyle prevails in the army. However, a small number of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men, today serve in two infantry battalions and two technical air force units. In their case, the military takes it for granted that Haredi men can only serve in exclusively male units and thus the IDF is willing to create 'sterile' (i.e., men only) environments for them (Sasson-Levy 2014).

Nationalist Orthodox (or Modern Orthodox), on the other hand, take a completely opposite position: they not only serve in the military, but see it as a holy mission, part of their commitment to the 'Land of Israel'. Military service has become a constitutive element in the life course of young nationalist Orthodox men, and they are overrepresented in combat units, in elite units and in the senior command. Indeed, nationalist Orthodox soldiers currently comprise approximately one quarter of all IDF combat soldiers, and up to a half of all junior officers (Levy 2010). The military is indebted to these highly motivated soldiers, but they are also blamed for a growing process of religionization of the military, and its gendered consequences. The idea that religious soldiers will serve alongside women, as instructors or combat soldiers, has encountered vehement opposition from Zionist rabbis, who claim that joint service of men and women does not enable religious soldiers to observe Jewish laws of modesty. Therefore, the religionization of the IDF has nurtured a growing phenomenon of gender separation that can lead to devaluation of women's military roles, or their exclusion altogether (Sasson-Levy 2014).

While Nationalist Orthodox men see military service as a holy mission, Nationalist Orthodox women are told by their Rabbis and teachers to stay at home, fearing that during their military service they will 'lose their modesty' and abandon the religious way of life. Indeed, the state grants all religious women an exemption from military service on grounds of religiosity. But, surprisingly, over the past five years more and more Nationalist Orthodox women have opted for enlistment, despite the edicts of their Rabbis and teachers, with an aim of proving that their commitment to the state is equivalent to that of men. It seems that for the Modern Orthodox women, military service is a personal expression of their identification with the robust and prolonged wave of religious feminism in Israel.

The case of the Druze population of Israel provides a very different demonstration of Enloe's notion of 'ethnic state security map'. The Druze constitute a small minority that live in Israel (a population of 100,000), Syria and Lebanon. With the exception of their secretive religion, the Druze rural life style, language, traditions and low socio-economic status resulting from state discrimination and neglect, are similar to that of the Muslim and Christian citizens of the country, and often they live in joint villages. The decision to draft Druze men in 1957 was part of a 'divide and conquer' policy that ensured the cooperation of the Druze, intensified the differences between the various Arab-speaking groups, and created a separate Druze ethnic group. Military service is not only mandatory for Druze men, but many of them choose it as a lifelong career, mostly due to a lack of alternative occupational options. Today, this mandatory service is a source of contention within the Druze community, as many young Druze claim that military service did not improve their social status in Israel and did not confer upon them the status of full citizens. Moreover, many of them identify as Palestinians and object to serving in the military that maintains the occupation of the Palestinian people in the West Bank. While conscription is mandatory for Druze men, Druze women are not allowed to

enlist, thus ensuring they will remain in the closed private sphere of the home and the family. In this case, cultural and religious perceptions of femininity are the main reason for their exclusion from the public sphere, including the military.

Analysis of the social organization of the Israeli military elucidates how the intersections of gender, ethnicity, nationality and religiosity draw the boundaries of military participation. Since the Israeli military is based on mandatory conscription, it does not need to turn to the lower classes to meet personnel needs, and thus class affiliation is less significant in constructing the military's social architecture. Ethnic and religious cultures, on the other hand, are more important in outlining the military's social organization in Israel, and they always draw clear gendered distinctions between men who are conscripted by law and women who are exempted from service. This is true for all social groups in Israel, with the exception of 'non-ethnic' secular middle class, men and women who enlist at almost in the same rates.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the detailed description of the dynamic social structure of the Israeli and US militaries clarifies that without intersectional analysis, one cannot see a complete picture. Employing intersectionality as the main methodology for analysing complex institutions (Acker 2006, see also Carrieras, Chapter 7, this volume) allows us to see the intricate structure of the military: who is serving where and why, and who cannot or does not want to serve, and why. Moreover, intersectional analysis not only contributes to the precise description of the social organization of militaries, but is key in understanding the various factors that influence this structure. For example, this analysis emphasizes that looking at the intersection of race/ethnicity and gender in the military is not enough: while in the US military questions of class are as crucial as gender and race, in the Israeli military questions of nationality and religious cultures are critical. Thus, intersectionality, as multiple forms of oppression and privilege, takes differential forms in different societies. But what is common to most nation states is that the military is a central state institution, a policy instrument of the state. As such, the intersectional structure of the military produces or reproduces the structure of civilian society, constituting long-term social categories, power relations, identity formations and social hierarchies.

NOTES

1. One does not have to be a citizen to serve in the US military (Lundquist 2008: 480) or the British armed forces (Mason and Dandeker 2009: 398).
2. Ashkenazim are Jews of European origin and represent, for the most part, the middle and upper classes of Israeli society.
3. Mizrahim are Jews of Middle East and North African origin, who primarily occupy the lower echelons of Israeli Jewish society.

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